Tony Panyi Continued: A Shake Up in the Legislature

Though the young Tories of Tony Clement were elated with the victory of Brian Mulroney and their role in his success, there was still a lot of work to be done in Ontario. The party under Bill Davis, was said to be moving to the left of the Liberals, as they worked to appease a more urbanized and progressive province.

Many members of the government, including Gordon Walker, Alan Pope, and senior cabinet minister Frank Miller, also believed the party had drifted too far to the he left, and saw in this group of young radicals, potential allies who could be used as shock troops, should they decide to run for leadership. (1)

They would soon be given an opportunity when Bill Davis announced that he would be stepping down. In a tight race, Frank Miller won the leadership race at their January convention, and was named premier on February 8, 1985, by appealing to those in favour of a swing back to the right.

One supporter was a backbencher from Nippising, who was drawn in part to Miller's previous plans to close a number of hospitals and consolidate urban services. His ideas failed because of opposition from within Miller's own party, but when this MPP from Nippising, later became premier, he, Mike Harris, would not fail.

At the time the PCs were at 55% in the polls, so Miller immediately called an election. It would prove to be his Waterloo.

Ontario Not Ready for Right Wing Revolution:

William Davis was a Red Tory, which is where the provinces' comfort zone lay. However, Frank Miller was not, and he may have been misguided to believe that he could draw the electorate in with a complete shift in policy. Bob Rae, then leader of the Ontario NDP, explains:

Miller was actually older than Davis, and cut from a very different cloth. He was affable enough, but determined to take his party to the right. His plaid jackets spoke of another era. His references to Reagan and Thatcher spoke of an ideological agenda that, to that point, had been foreign to the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party.

Frank Miller's message seemed to be the one the party faithful wanted to hear in early 1985. When the Tory convention was held, the delegates rejected younger, more progressive voices. The great beneficiary of this choice was not me but David Peterson. I did not fully realize this at the time, nor did I understand that the more effective I was in demolishing Miller, the more I was simply opening up room for Peterson. Three-party politics in Ontario create a unique dynamic. For the better part of my lifetime, the success of the Ontario Tories had been their ability to occupy the middle, forcing the Liberals often to the right, and us to the left. (2)

Miller came on the scene in Ontario, in the same way that Barry Goldwater first shocked the moderate and progressive populace in the United States.

(Bob Rae is in the centre of the 1970 photo on the left, and to his left is someone you may have heard of: Michael Ignatieff. They were lifelong friends and roomed together when they were both at Harvard)

Rae continues:

The choice of Miller put the Tories well to the right, and created a generational divide as well. The Liberals' campaign in 1985 was well organized and well presented. Mine was less confident at first, and by the time we gained our voice it was too late. We didn't have enough money, so I had to share a bus with the press. Someone gave me an electric piano, and I drove them crazy with what I thought were clever songs about Frank Miller and the Tories. At the same time, David Peterson was cruising with confidence, promising beer and wine in the corner store, and looking and sounding more like a winner. (2)

But what also hurt the Tories, was Bill Davis's decision that it was time to provide equal funding to Catholic high schools. This definitely became an election issue. When the results were in the PCs were reduced to 52 seats, the Liberals had 48 and the NDP 25, giving them the balance of power. But in a surprise move, Bob Rae brokered a deal with the Liberals , promising support for two years, if his agenda was honoured. Peterson grabbed the opportunity and the PCs became the opposition for the first time in 42 years.

Miller resigned on August 20, 1985, having served as premier for just six months.

The accord with the NDP had proved a gift from God for the Liberals. The agenda that Rae demanded was wildly popular with the electorate, and the Ontario economy—recovering nicely, it seemed, from the early eighties recession—was more than able to accommodate the necessary increase in government spending. Environmental laws were toughened, the scope of rent controls widened. Money was spent on child care and affordable housing. Equal rights for homosexuals were entrenched in the province's human rights code. First steps were taken towards pay equity for women. And most important, the Liberals moved to ban extra billing by doctors, an increasingly common practice across the province. The doctors reacted by going on a limited strike. The government stared them down. The strike collapsed.(3)

Continued: A Party Self Destructs

Sources:

1. Promised Land: Inside the Mike Harris Revolution, By John Ibbitson, 1997, ISBN: 0136738648, Pg. 33

2. From Protest to Power: Personal Reflections on a Life in Politics, By Bob Rae, Viking Press, 1996, ISBN: 0-670-86842-6, Pg. 89-90

3. Ibbitson, 1997, Pg. 35

Tony Panayi Continued: Ontarians for Responsible Government

By 1990, the Ontario Conservatives with a new party leader and new president, were in trouble.

There was good news and bad news for Brampton South MPP* Tony Clement right after the 1990 election. The good news was that he'd been elected party president. The bad news came during his first day on the job, when he received a phone call from the party's chief financial officer. "Congratulations on becoming party president," said the CFO. "I just want to let you know that we're $5.4 million in debt. That means before we pay a nickel on staff, before we pay a nickel on brochures, anything, we have to pay in interest $625,000 a year —$13,000 a week. And right now we have about $4,000 in the bank."

That was the financial state of the Big Blue Machine following the 1990 leadership campaign. Mike Harris had inherited a massive debt, racked up during all those leadership campaigns. After the fall election of 1990, things looked grim for the Tories. With the party consistently at 15 or 20 percent in the polls, the $5.4 million debt sat like a huge boulder on a road, blocking any chance the Tories may have had of rejuvenating themselves. That's when Mike Harris made one of the toughest decisions of his political career — he shut down party headquarters. It was the only thing the party could do, but it meant that the once mighty Big Blue Tory Machine of Ontario no longer existed. Traditional Conservatives were aghast. It was unthinkable for them; it was akin to the Albany Club running out of twelve-year-old scotch. The Tories had no party headquarters and no paid political staff. (1)

The election held September 6, 1990, put the Conservatives in third place with 20 seats. But the results of this election would prove to be a blessing in disguise, because it gave Bob Rae's NDP a majority government, at a time when Ontario was heading into a severe recession.

But this also meant that a socialist government had taken the helm, and there was no way corporate Canada was going to allow this, so their advocacy groups swung into action. Leading the charge was the National Citizens Coalition, who created a spin-off group called Ontarians for Responsible Government, headed up by Stephen Harper's** former VP when he himself was president of the NCC, Gerry Nicholls.

Throughout the government of NDP leader Bob Rae, Gerry headed the NCC project group, “Ontarians for Responsible Government”. Among numerous activities this group erected anti-Rae billboards throughout the province. This style of billboard advocacy was imitated nationwide and was featured in Campaigns and Elections magazine. Besides overseeing and co-coordinating the NCC's overall political and communication strategies, Gerry also acted as the group’s media spokesman, edited its newsletters and wrote its op-eds, news releases and fundraising letters. (2)

Bob Rae didn't stand a chance. Nicholls describes the constant attacks.

The NCC’s Golden Age occurred in the early- to mid-1990s, when Bob Rae was the NDP Premier of Ontario. To be blunt, Rae was a disaster. His economic platform of high taxes, big spending, and massive deficits was wrecking the economy. Of course, this made him the perfect poster boy for the NCC. We lambasted his ruinous, socialist agenda with newspaper ads, radio commercials, TV spots, and billboards. At one point, we dubbed him the “Buffalo Business Booster Man of the Year,” because we believed that his onerous taxes were driving Ontario businesses to New York State. Another time, we put up a billboard which featured three photos: one of a mousetrap, labeled “Mouse Killer,” another of a fly swatter (“Bug Killer”), and, finally, a photo of Rae (“Job Killer”).

These ad campaigns generated a lot of publicity for our organization and attracted a lot of people to join the NCC as paying members. Rae’s ineptitude made it easier than ever for us to mount fundraising campaigns. Basically, all I had to do was write letters to people saying “We want to dump Bob Rae,” and they would send me back huge cheques to pay for more anti-NDP ad campaigns. In fact, I must confess to feeling something akin to pleasure — albeit slightly guilt-laden pleasure — in those days of bad economic news. After all, the worse things got for Ontario’s economy, the better things got for us.

What all this goes to show is that if you want to make a living from politics in any way, even if you are just engaging in advocacy work, you need a bad guy or a villain. To mobilize your supporters, you have to be able to point to somebody and say, “Hey, there’s a scary guy out there whose policies are going to hurt you. That’s why you need us.” (3)

Actually Bob Rae's tenure was not as bad as history suggests. He himself admits that he made mistakes, in large part due to inexperience, but he also accomplished a great deal.

The National Citizens Coalition put up billboards with Rae and Stalin side by side, and rich stockbrokers led a protest parade to Queen's Park and shouted for Rae's head. He never had a chance. Bay Street and big business shunned him and his government like they were lepers. Still, Rae managed to save the jobs of the Algoma Steel Workers in Sault Ste. Marie, Ont., and the jobs of the workers in the De Havilland plant in Toronto. The media was hostile to Rae's government. Today the media keeps talking about his NDP government, but never mention that he presided over the worst Ontario recession since the Great Depression. (4)

And those hostile attacks were often personal, and understandably rattled the premier.

The National Citizens'Coalition, a shadowy front group with big money, had already rented a billboard just around the corner from Queen's Park, displaying posters worthy of Allende's Chile. The huffing and puffing of right-wing types who could never bring themselves to go to Ottawa to worry about Mulroney and Wilson's deficits (much higher and far more out of control than ours) was set in permanent motion. They now have billboards fawning over Mike Harris. (5)

Rae was right. Mulroney had created the largest deficit in Canadian history. The largest of course until Jim Flaherty and Stephen Harper would blow that record out of the water. Why was Rae's deficit, that helped to save jobs, wrong; and yet the Harper government's good when it has done little to protect jobs? Employment figures are misleading because many people are opting for part-time, or much lower paying jobs out of necessity.

It's for this reason that I don't think Jack Layton could ever be prime minister because these "shadowy" groups financed by the corporate world simply won't allow it. It's too bad because I really like Jack Layton and loved Ed Broadbent when he headed the party.

National Citizens Coalition and Other Right-Wing Groups Help Mike Harris

Footnotes:

*Tony Clement was not yet MPP. He wasn't elected to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario until 1995.

** In 2001 and 2002 Gerry Nicholls wrote fundraising letters and ad copy for Stephen Harper during his run for the Canadian Alliance leadership. His fundraising letters raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for the Harper campaign. (2)

Sources:

1. Right Turn: How the Tories Took Ontario, By Christina Blizzard, Dundern Press, 1995, ISBN 1550022547, Pg. 9

2. About Gerry from Gerry Nicholl's blog.

3. In politics, you need a bad guy, By Gerry Nicholls, December 3, 2008

4. Bob Rae would make a great prime minister, By Larry Zolf, CBC News Viewpoint, May 9, 2006

5. From Protest to Power: Personal Reflections on a Life in Politics, By Bob Rae, Viking Press, 1996, ISBN: 0-670-86842-6, Pg. 196

Tony Clement Takes on the Reform Party

A CULTURE OF DEFIANCE: History of the Reform-Conservative Party of Canada

After the 1990 election, the Ontario neoconservatives had five years to build up their party. They had hired Republican strategist, Mike Murphy, to create the "Common Sense" campaign, fashioned after one he ran for New Jersey Governor, Christine Todd Whitman, right down to the 30% reduction in income taxes.

Anthony Panayi, now Tony Clement, was president of the party and acting as secretary for Harris, as they travelled the province and networked with right-wing organizations, in preparation for the next election.

But they had one stumbling block that could lead to their downfall: The Reform Party. There were several members who wanted Reform to run in provincial elections, and began making preparations for an Ontario party. Kimble F. Ainslie, who had been PC leader in Southwestern Ontario, left to form the Reform Association of Ontario, which left Clement and others worried that they could split the vote.

In their research on the 1990 election, the Tories discovered that the presence of fourth parties meant a difference between a minority and a majority government for the NDP. If the Tories had picked up two-thirds of the fourth-party vote that went to groups such as the Family Coalition Party, they would have won 10 extra seats in the legislature. Instead of only 20 seats, they would have had a far more respectable 30, leaving the NDP to form a minority government.
　
It fell to former party president ... Tony Clement to staunch the flow of votes from the Conservatives to fourth parties. The biggest fourth-party headache for the Tories was the threat of Reform running in Ontario. The federal Tories obviously had failed to respect Reform. Ontario Tories didn't want to make the same colossal blunder. Clement, son of former Ontario attorney general John Clement, gave himself the task of learning everything about the western-based party that had wreaked such havoc with his federal counterparts.

"I wanted to learn not only about them, but to allow them to learn about us," Clement recalled. "We were absolutely convinced that if they were to look at us, and look at where we were coming from, we might not be able to satisfy them on 100 percent of the stuff, but we could satisfy them on 80 percent of it. And maybe that would be enough to reduce or eliminate the threat of splitting the vote and allowing 130 Liberals to get in, just as we'd seen 98 out of 99 Liberals federally in the province of Ontario." (1)

But Clement did not have to fight this himself. A group led by Craig Chandler, Focus Federally For Reform (FFFR) (2), came to the rescue, as he would many times for the neoconservative movement. Chandler had provided input for the Common Sense Revolution and wasn't about to throw it all away now.

The Tories took a two-pronged approach. They planned to make connections with the grass roots as well as the elite of the Reform Party. Concerning the grass roots, Clement hit pay dirt when he acquired a fairly comprehensive list of every Reform member in Ontario, some 25,000 names. The Tories sent out mailings incessantly to every Reform member on that list, with letters that went a little like this.

"Hi, my name's Mike Harris. You don't know a lot about me but here's some policy. Here's where we stand as a provincial party. You might be interested in it." The plan was always to lead with policy. Grass-roots people talk about policy. There was no point telling people to vote Conservative to avoid splitting the vote. Voters have no stake in strategic voting. They simply don't care. Main Street Ontarians care deeply about issues. Reformers hate the old top-down style of politics and like discussions on policy. The Tories caught the wave. In mailing after mailing, they asked the Reformers for their opinions — on education, crime, and the deficit. They sent out questionnaires and were amazed at the number that were returned.

Kindred souls with shared goals. Besides, the Reform Party was already in trouble when it was discovered that they had neo-Nazis operating within their ranks.

"We were very, very clear though, in our dealings with them that we weren't going to change who we were for them. Mike was very clear on this. We would share information with them. We should share who we were. If they felt comfortable with us, that was their choice, come on board. We're an open party. You can join up, you can get involved in the riding associations, etc."If you do not feel comfortable with us, this is who we are, we are not going to change who we are for you, but we understand," Clement said. He stressed that there was never any intention to "out reform Reform."

"We never said, 'How can we change ourselves to make our-selves more acceptable to you?"' Clement recalled. That would have been as much an affront to Reform followers as it would have been to mainstream Conservatives. The Tories kept it simple: they shared policy statements, introduced their leader Mike Harris, and told Reformers that they were welcome to climb aboard. A lot of Reform members took up the invitation and easily integrated themselves with the Tories at the riding level. In Cambridge, the federal Reform Party candidate headed up the candidate search committee for the Tories' provincial candidate. In Durham West and in Al Palladini's riding of York Centre, Reformers were members of the executive.

In addition to courting grass-roots Reformers, the Ontario Tories set out to create a working relationship with the movers and shakers within the federal Reform Party. Mike Harris met three times with Reform Party leader Preston Manning, the first meeting taking place in December 1993. They met again on 3 May 1994. At that time, Harris and Clement talked to Manning, his campaign manager Rick Anderson, and Ed Harper, the only Reformer from Ontario, prior to the release of the Common Sense Revolution. They shared with Manning and his people their ideas on welfare reform, tax cuts, and deficit reduction, and they asked the Reformers if they had any ideas which they wanted to share with them. The provincial Tories needed Manning and Reform on side. More specifically, they needed to spell out to Manning that there was no room on the right for a fourth party in the Ontario election. (Before the Tories left Ottawa, they discussed their radical plan with Tory leader Jean Charest, his policy gurus, and Conservative senators.)

The third phase of the campaign to deal with the Reform threat took place the day after the launch of the Common Sense Revolution in the spring of 1994. Harris met with Manning and his people and then the Tory caucus. They invited Jean Chretien and the Liberals, but they were too busy. Ah, well. Essentially, said Clement, they were treating the federal Reform Party with respect, while not trying to pretend to be something they were not. As a result, Manning decided not to branch into provincial politics. In October 1994, Tory efforts paid off. In an official vote at the Reform General Assembly, close to 70 percent of the members from Ontario and two-thirds of the Canada-wide membership voted against running candidates in
provincial elections.

Clement attributed the higher vote in Ontario to the massive effort which the Tories had made to get their message out to Reform members in that province. There were no deals struck, no high-powered strategic discussions. It was a matter of each leader setting out policy and forging informal links. Formal ties were far less important than getting to know each other. And it worked. Reform stayed home during the 1995 election. (1)

Ainslee was not happy, and accused the Harris team of sabotaging him. The results of the election were 82 seats for Tories, 30 for the Liberals, and the NDP were reduced to 17.

Mike Harris and Ontario Under Corporate Rule

Sources:

1. Right Turn: How the Tories Took Ontario, By Christina Blizzard, Dundern Press, 1995, ISBN 1550022547, Pg. 64-67

2. What are People Saying About PGIB, PGIB Website, Accessed July 23, 2010